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1 Introduction 
 
As the long subtitle indicates, the book under review is concerned with the widespread 
challenges to universities in terms of increased political pressures to be governed according 
to a narrow set of measures of output efficiency and job creation effects, at the expense of 
their core purpose as institutions of higher education and research. The authors of the book 
are university professors with a background in US social science and professional 
experiences as university leaders and administrators, deans, presidents, and fundraising 
consultants. Two of them have previously published on matters of university politics (Bowen 
& Schwartz 2005; in a note they state that of the book’s nine chapters, chapter 5 through 9 
draw heavily upon this earlier work).  
The aim of analyzing the core purpose of contemporary universities is a highly welcome 
one, considering that institutions of higher education today are rapidly changing and highly 
exposed and susceptive to shifting political regimes of governance. These pressures interfere 
with the institutional autonomy they have achieved to varying degrees, depending upon the 
different political and historical contingencies and the social contexts they are situated in. The 
situation calls for differentiated and comparative analytical approaches to meet the promise of 
the title of the book, talking about ‘the core’ purpose and ‘the coming’ of certain threats 
against academic freedom. 
The authors present their book as based upon the assumption that the core purpose of 
universities is to create, preserve, transmit, validate, and find new applications for 
knowledge. They argue that university governance processes should take ideas and discourse 
about ideas far more seriously than they are often taken within many of today’s universities. 
Universities should consciously recognize and conserve, as the authors phrase it, the entire 
range of available ideas, rather than primarily focus upon economy and efficiency as a 
dominating perspective because the later tends to curtail academic freedom. The book 
presents arguments and critical reflections about the control and monitoring of what they call 
“the marketplace of ideas”, a metaphor they find attractive as “the competition of ideas leads 
more readily to progress than any other path” (p.39). In the beginning chapters of their book, 
Bowen, Schwartz and Camp are preoccupied with describing the history of US higher 
education; some of the organizational structures and constraints upon the flow of information 
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within universities; the role of language and group-based situated understanding in university 
governance; and the relationships between administrators, faculty members and students, 
always emphasizing the heterogeneous purposes of teaching, research and development.  
Among the impediments to achieving the core purpose of universities, the authors identify 
and discuss five major such ‘idea inhibitors’ or ‘vetting systems’, as they also call them 
(alluring to the political sense of vetting as a strictly biased selection process). These five 
impediments are authoritarianism, corporatism, illiberalism, supernaturalism, and political 
correctness. The authors try to elucidate how these phenomena inhibit achievements at 
various levels, and want to show how to respond to such threats. They are prescribing 
relatively autonomous universities to counter unhealthy tendencies. Such universities are 
characterized by openness, transparency, dissent, and the maintenance of balance between 
conflicting perspectives, values, and interests. Although one may find the singling out of 
some of the threats to academic freedom a bit surprising, their US perspective may explain 
this and the authors clarify in some detail in their selection of perils and give reasoned 
arguments connected to each threat, at least on a general level.  
The fact that threats to academic freedom in many respects are global makes it a bit 
disappointing that the authors, writing from a North American background, do not investigate 
how these trends are manifested globally (cf. Frank and Gabler 2006, de Brary 2010) or try to 
compare and distinguish global trends from local peculiarities. This means that some of the 
threats to academic freedom they describe, such as corporatism, can be recognized widely 
across major regions, while others, such as the threat of religious influence 
(‘supernaturalism’) or of ‘political correctness’ may seem more local. They discuss and 
criticize political correctness both from the right and in particular from the left, and the 
concomitant tendency to “flee from serious, open, political debate” at campus, but they give 
no real analysis of the very notion of political correctness, or indicate that it is in itself an 
inherently contested concept. A discussion of the genealogy of this phenomenon or of 
specific cases would have been instructive. This lack gives the book a certain taint of 
parochialism and limits its use or outreach. Adding to this impression is the way the authors 
often implicitly refer to phenomena that may have been highly debated in their local 
communities but without giving the reader any hint or references to the cases discussed. An 
example is their mentioning of a certain “conspiracy theory of ignorance” (p. 70ff) that they 
neither explain nor provide any references to, leaving it to the reader to search the internet 
and find that it might refer to writer and newspaper reporter Martin L. Gross’ institutional 
critique of the presumed low standards of US basic education and of the ‘education 
establishment’ (Gross 1999). A more active editorial process at Information Age Publishing 
could have improved the book in such cases. 
This is not to denigrate the mentioning of local debates or specific examples, if properly 
contextualized and documented. In fact, at long passages, such illustrations could have 
enriched the rhetorical style of a text that at some points is experienced as a thinly abstract 
lingo of complex systems thinking, stating generalities and abstaining from concretizing the 
tendencies discussed. No doubt the authors draw on their large pool of academic and 
managerial experience, and perhaps they take care not to damage the reputation of colleagues 
and institutions they have interacted with, but a very generalized discourse is a tiring read and 
it often feels repetitive. In this sense, the book stands in sharp contrast to the seminal piece on 
academic freedom in the US by Matthew Finkin and Robert C. Post (2009) that, apart from 
offering a clear conceptual analysis of the very notion of academic freedom, its elements 
(freedom of research and publication, freedom of teaching, freedom of intramural expression 
and of extramural expression) and the legal background for these elements, is well illustrated 
with historical controversies, precedents and cases.  
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2 Carving up the threats against academic freedom  
 
The authors of The End of Academic Freedom declare that it is written “in the perspective of 
critical university studies” (back cover) but they do not present any conspicuous efforts to 
relate the book scholarly to that tradition, draw from its sources, or even specify how their 
contribution stands out from that very heterogeneous field. Compared to other contributions 
to critical university studies (e.g., Kirp 2003; Geiger 2004; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004; 
Bousquet 2008; Karran 2009; Radder 2010; Nixon 2011), their book has more the character 
of a sketchily assembled manifesto. To illustrate this, let us compare their diagnostics of 
threats divided into the five categories with other contributions to the field, such as the widely 
acclaimed report by English professor and president of the American Association of 
University Professors between 2006 and 2012, Cary Nelson, i.e., his 2010 book (see Table 1). 
Nelson’s threat taxonomy, though overlapping with that of the authors’ of The End of 
Academic Freedom, is more fine-grained, less idealist, and duly sensitive to the importance of 
tenure as a supportive structure for academic freedom.  
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of threats to academic freedom as categorized by the book under review 
(the five threats on the right) and by Nelson 2010 (the sixteen threats below). Descriptions of the 
same or similar phenomena by the categories are marked by an x. If there is uncertainty about 
sameness or similarity, this is marked by an (x). See text for explanation. 
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1. Instrumentalization  x    
2. Contingency      
3. Authoritarian administraton x     
4. Abuses of the national security state   (x)   
5. Administration restrictions on the use of 
communication technology 
     
6. Unwarrented research oversight x     
7. Neoliberal assaults on academic disciplines  x    
8. Managerial ideology x x    
9. Circumvention of shared governance x x    
10. Globalization      
11. Opposition to human rights      
12. Inadequate grievance procedures      
13. Religious intolerance      x  
14. Political intolerance   (x)  x 
15. Legal threats      
16. Claims of financial crisis      
 
 
The authors of The End of Academic Freedom define authoritarianism in general terms as 
something that recognizes only authority that resides in an individual person, providing no 
room for dissent, or careful systematic consideration of various competing ideas or 
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perspectives (p.120). In the academy, individual carriers of authoritarian ideas “potentially 
include politicians, wealthy trustees and donors, accrediting agencies, senior university 
administrators, and faculty members alike” (p.121). Two ways for authoritarianism to take 
form, according to the authors, is to limit academic freedom or restrict resources in specific 
areas of development. As an example they mention the post 9/11 concerns for national 
security that led a group called Campus Watch emerge to monitor and ‘review and critique’ 
the work of key faculty members of Middle East Studies allegedly to counter errors and 
biases in their scholarship (p.122). Other examples include a company offering to construct a 
building for a certain program on campus, but in return the university had to guarantee 
priority to research results that might give this company a substantial advantage. As one can 
see, the category of authoritarianism is fairly broad, and overlapping with several of Nelson’s 
more narrow categories. It should be said that Nelson’s list is seen by himself as provisional 
and enumerating threats that overlap and interact. He says that a decade ago he might “have 
collapsed several of these entries under the single heading of ‘corporatization’, but the 
evolving culture of higher education now requires further differentiation of the forces shaping 
our present and our future. They are no longer narrowly economic. If there is a single heading 
under which we can list the forces operating on higher education, it may well be 
‘neoliberalism’” (Nelson 2010, p. 60).  
Most of the threats broadly categorized by the authors are also covered by Nelson’s list, 
except perhaps ‘illiberalism’, to be discussed below. But Nelson’s list reveals some dangers 
to academic freedom not dealt with in any depth by Bowen, Schwartz and Camp (cf. Table 
1). This includes, for instance, the problems of contingency, i.e., non-tenured contingent 
teachers often teaching more than half of the teaching loads but with a much more precarious 
position to benefit from their rights to free intramural and extramural speech. Another 
problem are restrictions on the use of email and other communication technology (such as 
breaches of letter privacy). Nelson also considers globalization, when for instance 
universities seek to market their products in other countries and may be tempted to abandon 
the standards that protect academic freedom in their home institutions. Opposition to human 
rights, including rights for employee groups to bargain collectively, is also a serious factor 
affecting academic freedom, which – like lack of grievance procedures, legal threats and 
claims of financial crisis as an excuse to re-organize or cut-down faculty – call for more 
specific analyses, as they do not fit easily into the five categories given by the authors.  
‘Illiberalism’ or ‘anti-liberalism’ is defined not as being against liberalism in the US 
political sense, but as against what the authors call the ‘liberal mindset’ embedded in the 
notion of liberal education. In their idealist vein, the authors state that this mindset 
“recognizes, appreciates, and respects the systematic unity of reason”, giving great weight to 
the aim of striving for “coherence, uniformity, consistency, generality, and harmony of 
thought in all state of affairs” (p. 138). In order to understand both the philosophical-political 
stance of the authors and what I see as a failure to posit themselves adequately within such 
traditions (as they stick to a standard liberal-conservative dichotomy), it is beneficial to pay 
attention to the continuation of their remark: The ‘liberalism’ (that they need as their contrast 
to define illiberalism as one more threat to academic freedom) “seeks to use the best possible 
knowledge to inform decision processes and, insofar as possible, to assume views and build 
and maintain institutions that are optimally conducive for the use of reason and rationality in 
the resolution of conflict throughout society.” (p.138).  
Although this draws an outline of a sympathetic stance, and a viewpoint that fits well with 
an adherence to the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce (and indeed they hurry to enroll 
Peirce in ‘a liberal epistemological position’, p. 140), the insistency upon a uniformity of 
thought in all state of affairs is also something of a heavy metaphysical proclamation that is 
problematic from the point of view of post-positivist philosophy of science, having 
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emphasized that research comes in many forms and that a plurality of styles of reasoning or 
styles of inquiry is at work across the disciplines (e.g., Hacking 2002). At least, room should 
be made for dissenters that prefer to adhere to a more pluralist ‘disunity of science’ 
metaphysics that does not aim at a grand synthetic ontology or metaphysics of science 
equally valid for all fields across the natural and social sciences and the humanities. Just like 
the importance of freedom of religion in society at large, there should also be a similar 
acknowledgement of a ‘freedom of metaphysics’ within science and scholarship in general. 
This allows researchers to work together on research projects within or across disciplines 
without first having to reach consensus on their ultimate metaphysical convictions, just like 
citizens of all religious convictions collaborate within the institutions of an open society. 
But what is more important in the quoted statement is an awareness of a central value of 
universities for society at large because of their impact as institution-building and institution-
maintaining entities. The authors try to hide their allegiances to some place on a fragile 
balance between liberal and conservative sentiments in the US political sense. However, they 
inadvertently slide back to this political sense of ‘liberal’ when they argue for policies that 
would advance the causes of a limited government, inspired by Hayek (p. 139). Their cause 
could have been better expressed and theoretically embedded had they articulated it by the 
conceptual vocabulary of the republican tradition of political thought with its focus on strong 
institutions as a precondition for a well-functioning democracy (see Fukuyama 2004 and later 
works).  
In accusing academics and students for ‘illiberalism’ one of their more specific targets 
seems to be the epistemic relativism in postmodernist thinking, typical of the 1990s, and in 
general what the authors sense as “an intellectual atmosphere in which all alleged facts and 
reason – the underpinnings of all knowledge – were portrayed as being political derivatives of 
those in power, or those seeking power” (p. 144). Radical epistemic relativism is indeed 
deeply flawed and self-defeating, but also there seems to be a subtle slide from a critique of a 
certain debate climate or intellectual atmosphere lacking tolerance and open-mindedness to a 
critique of a philosophical flaw that is not fully spelled out. And one may wonder how well 
their own wish to expel ‘illiberalism’ sits with their mission statement that the university 
should aim at conserving “the entire range of available ideas”, “the complete range of 
thinkable thoughts” (p.113). Even though we might see the university as a “storehouse of 
ideas” (ibid.), this metaphor misrepresents the dynamics of critical evaluation and constant 
reinterpretation of knowledge.  
 
 
3 The marketplace of ideas 
 
The authors are very skeptical about neoliberal enforcements like outcome indicators 
reflecting enrollments, graduation rates, research productivity, etc., and they rightly claim 
that the choice of which productivity indicators to use is an inherently political one (p. 29). 
Yet, there is no detailed analysis of new public management or other neoliberal installations 
of governance. They note that decisions that affect productivity of universities “are not 
simple matters that boil down to rationally choosing what works from what does not work” 
(p.30), and they see these as being about control and balance between value tradeoffs in 
continually challenging decision situations. But the alternative they offer is not what one 
might have expected, say, in the form of a republican vision of universities as institutions 
providing for not only science and technology for the market, but also an ideational 
infrastructure for a modern state and its civic society with strong democratic institutions of 
health, environment, education, culture, political communication and security.  
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The alternative they offer seems to be just another economic metaphor for the university, 
not that of a production unit, but ‘a free marketplace of ideas’ (pp. 31, 39, 144). They think 
that to achieve the best possible performance within university communities, the designs for 
governance and control structures determining the flow of information should be predicated 
upon the premise that a free marketplace of ideas directly promotes the advancement of 
knowledge and indirectly promotes social and economic progress as well. In a note they refer 
to philosopher and Hayek’s disciple William Warren Bartley, III, for an analysis of this 
metaphor (Bartley 1999) that can be tracked to several sources, among them most famously 
the Hungarian-British polymath Michael Polanyi whom they don’t mention. Polanyi debated 
research policy and how to legitimate basic research with the socialist and scientist John D. 
Bernal in the 1960s (Mirowski 1997; Fischer and Mandell 2009). Already at that time 
Polanyi’s vision of an autonomous ‘republic of science’, which would be publicly funded, but 
in which the scientific community itself would set priorities, was seen by many as politically 
naïve, considering the increasing expenses on research and the close ties between basic and 
applied research. Bowen, Schwartz and Camp basically repeat that vision, but fail to connect 
it to a socially sensitive analysis of the edifying character of modern universities, not just in 
an ideational sense, but in their social functions as having institution-building and 
maintaining capacities, as emphasized by Fukuyama (2004). Neoliberal theory as well as 
metaphors about the marketplace of ideas, even when supplied with complex systems 
thinking and evolutionary epistemology, fail to comprehend the central role for universities 
as places cultivating expert cultures and providing professional resources and a cognitive 
infrastructure for the democratic societies. 
Bowen, Schwartz and Camp hesitate to formulate what the core purpose of the university 
should be: Because of the complexity of today’s university governance, no single mind can 
comprehend all dimensions of the decisions that have to be taken, or their effects on the 
entire university, so they consider questionable the premise that a university ought to have 
any single or dominant goal. They think that it is the absence of any such purposes or goals 
that best allows students and individual faculty members the freedom to exchange their ideas 
and pursue their diverse self-interested goals and purposes, and so to contribute to knowledge 
formation most effectively. Thus, insofar as universities are markets in which students and 
faculty members freely supply and demand ideas, it is neither feasible nor desirable to 
attempt to control or shape them to conform to a single notion of a higher purpose. Yet, later 
on they link the core purpose to the preservation of a high variety of ideas (pp. 51, 113ff, 
166).  
Their own use of the ideas of evolutionary epistemology in the Hayek mode is hopefully 
better explained in their earlier work (Bowen and Schwartz 2005); in the book under review, 
the reader has to guess the structure of their underlying model. They seem to imply a 
cybernetic approach to the selection and retention of epistemically useful ideas, but this is not 
well developed in the text, and one gets the suspicion that natural selection is not the best 
explanatory scheme for understanding the creation and evaluation of new concepts, models or 
theories, or their further development. The authors are concerned about undue narrowing of 
the variety of ideas, but they often talk simplistically about ideas like neatly delimited items 
that appear and disappear as if they were genetic mutations. For instance, we learn that in 
“contrast to Darwin’s big idea of particulate inheritance, which so far seems to have 
withstood the test of scrutiny, Marx’s big idea of communism seems to have largely come 
and gone” (p. 116). One cringes at reading such statements, considering the complexity of 
Darwin’s or Marx’s work and its reception; Darwin’s thoughts about inheritance were not 
particularly endurable, and the communism that have come and gone cannot be ascribed to 
Marx without committing historical reductionism. 
 7 
This has of course nothing to do with the overall value of a welcome manifesto to combat 
the threats to academic freedom, but getting too many details wrong not only detracts from 
scholarly value, but it also bedevils the good intentions. The book begins with an epigraph 
quoting The Limits of State Action by Wilhelm von Humboldt (his name comes with a typo) 
on the “The true end of Man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal and immutable 
dictates of reason” and ends with the mini-biographies of the authors. It lacks an index.  
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